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In this paper we study the impact of the international migration of unskilled workers on skill 
formation and the average skill level in the home country. We analyze what appears to be the 
least threatening scenario from the point of view of its effect on the supply of skills at home: 
namely, migration exclusively by unskilled workers. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that 
even without the departure of skilled workers, the home country suffers reduced aggregate 
skill formation. Although as a response to a higher wage rate per unit of human capital in the 
new equilibrium skilled workers choose to accumulate more human capital than before the 
opening up to migration of unskilled workers, the number and share of skilled workers in the 
home country’s workforce fall. The combined effect is a decrease in the average level of 
human capital in the home country.  
 
 
Keywords: Migration of unskilled workers; Human capital formation; Depletion of human 
capital 






There is an understandable, if not always justified concern that the migration of skilled 
workers from developing countries (the “brain drain”) can harm these countries.
1
 There is no 
such concern, however, over the migration of unskilled workers: if skilled workers are 
immune to the employment prospects that lure unskilled workers, the leakage of human 
capital is avoided.
2
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility that this 
perception is misguided: good employment opportunities for unskilled work away from home 
affect human capital formation decisions at home. When the prospect of migration for 
attractive unskilled work abroad presents itself, the incentive to acquire skills is reduced, and 
skill formation is depressed. 
To address this question, we construct a model in which the developing country 
produces a single consumption good, using a combination of skilled and unskilled labor. After 
fully characterizing the closed economy, we introduce the prospect of migration by 
incorporating a migration quota, set by the developed country. The quota is for unskilled 
workers; access to skilled occupations is reserved for natives (as has often been the case, for 
example, in the Gulf States). From the point of view of the effect on the supply of skills at 
home, this looks like the least threatening scenario.  
We find that once unskilled workers can migrate, the average level of human capital 
increases. However, in the new equilibrium, the greater accumulation of human capital in 
response to the higher wage rate per unit of human capital is not sufficient to compensate for 
the fall in the share of skilled workers in the home country’s workforce. Even though 
departures will not cause skill depletion, there will be skill erosion on account of reduced skill 
formation. 
In Section 2 we construct a model of a developing economy closed to migration. In 
Section 3 we present the immediate and long-run realizations of the model once migration by 
unskilled workers is allowed. Section 4 contains a comparison between the open and closed 
settings. Section 5 concludes. The proofs of our Claims and Lemma are in the Appendix. 
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 The Katz and Stark (1984) response to Kwok and Leland (1982) can serve as an early example of the polemic 
of the literature on the “brain drain.” 
2
 A notable exception is Stark et al. (2009), who show that in contrast to villages from which people migrate to 
the U.S. to take up menial jobs, villages from which people migrate largely to Mexico City to take up skilled 
work in the formal and governmental sectors have a higher average level of schooling.  
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2. A closed economy equilibrium 
Consider an economy without migration in which a large number of identical firms produce a 
single consumption good, the price of which is normalized at 1. This good is manufactured by 
a combination of skilled labor (human capital), which we denote by H , and unskilled (raw) 
labor, L . The economy is populated by N  individuals (workers). 
Each individual chooses a skill type. He can decide to remain unskilled, or to invest in 
skill acquisition. The decision to join the ranks of the skilled is accompanied by a concomitant 
choice of how much human capital to acquire. The wage of an unskilled worker is 
L
w , and 
the wage of a skilled worker is given by the wage rate per unit of human capital, 
H
w , times 
the number of units of human capital that the skilled worker chooses to acquire, θ . The twice 
differentiable convex cost function of acquiring human capital is 1
K
Kθ − , where 1K >  is a 
constant. 
The utility function of an individual of type { },j H L∈  is  
ln( )
j j
U W= ,            (1) 




H H HW w wθ θ θ
−= − ,           (2) 
and for an unskilled worker  
( )
L L L
W w w= .                       (3) 
Given the wage payments, an individual who elects to become skilled chooses how 
much human capital to acquire by solving 
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; heretofore, an 









= .     (5) 
In equilibrium, both types of workers enjoy the same utility  
*








From here it follows that in the closed-economy equilibrium, the ratio of the wage of a skilled 








= .               (6) 
We assume that firms produce by means of a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
technology 
( ) 1i iH iLY N N
α αθ −= ,     (7) 
where iHN , iLN , and iHNθ  
are the “quantities” of skilled labor, unskilled labor, and human 
capital, respectively, employed by firm i. Because each firm uses the same technology, we 
can just as well assume that there is only one firm in the market that employs the entire 
country’s workforce and produces the consumption good according to the production function 
( ) 1H LY N N
α αθ −= .     (8) 
This single firm chooses how many skilled and unskilled workers to employ in order to bring 






H L H H L L
N N
N N w N w N
α αθ θ− − −
 
, 
subject to the constraint of the size of the working population  
L HN N N+ ≤ .     (9) 
Standard profit maximization requires equality of efficiency wages to the marginal product of 
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.     (13) 
In conjunction with the constraint of the size of the working population (9), equations (10), 
(11), and (13) yield the endogenous variables of the market equilibrium: 
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(14) 
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3. An economy open to migration 
3.1. The general setting 
Consider now the possibility of migration to a foreign economy, F, that is more developed 
than the home (developing) country, D. The labor market of F is characterized by wages 
*f
L L
w w> , *f
H H
w w> , and * *f
L H
w w θ< , where f
L
w  and f
H
w  - the foreign country’s wages for 
unskilled workers and for skilled workers, respectively - are given and are exogenous to the 
model. We assume that f
L
w  differs enough from *
L
w  and * *
H
w θ  for the impact of migration on 
wages not to interfere with the ordering f
L L Hw w w θ< <
%% % , where we use a tilde to indicate the 
value of a variable in the open-to-migration setting. Consistent, for example, with the 
migration policy of the Gulf States at some times, we assume that F confines access to its 
highly-paid skilled jobs to natives, and allows migrants in to work only in unskilled jobs.  
Let M  denote the number of migrants. We assume that F admits migrants up to quota 
*
L
M N< , and therefore, the constraint M M≤  binds with equality. Let those who end up as 
migrants be selected randomly from the pool of unskilled workers such that each unskilled 
worker migrates to and works in F with probability ( )0,1p ∈ , or stays and works in D with 
the complementary probability 1 p− .
3








Assuming that M  is sufficiently small in comparison with the number of unskilled 
workers in D, each individual’s decision (whether to remain unskilled or join the ranks of 
skilled) has only a marginal effect on the total number of skilled workers and consequently, 
on the probability of migration. Thus, individuals perceive p as a parameter, and in what 
follows we employ the notation p rather than ( )
H
p N% , unless the context mandates otherwise.  
We also assume that the number of births remains unchanged when the economy opens 
up to migration. This assumption is justified when migration is temporary and/or when 
migrants are not accompanied by their families, and again corresponds to a feature of 
migration from Asia to the Gulf States (Lucas, 2005). 
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 Stark et al. (1997, 1998) introduced this protocol. 
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As before, each individual decides whether or not to acquire skills, bearing in mind his 
migration prospects. After acting on his decision, the individual has a one-shot chance to 
migrate. 
 
3.2 The “immediate” run 
Claim 1: In the “immediate” run, upon the migration of M  unskilled workers, the following 
changes take place: 
(a) The average level of human capital in the home country increases. 
(b) The wages of skilled (unskilled) workers decrease (increase). 
When employment prospects abroad present themselves, the returns to being unskilled rise; 
new arrivals on the labor market prefer to remain unskilled rather than to engage in human 
capital formation. This is due to both the employment prospects abroad and to higher (lower) 
domestic wages for unskilled (skilled) work. The economy undergoes a transition where the 
new unskilled workers replace the oldest, both skilled and unskilled workers, and 
consequently lower (increase) the marginal product and wages of unskilled (skilled) work. 
This process continues until the new individuals find human capital acquisition to be as 
rewarding as remaining unskilled; an open-to-migration equilibrium is reached. 
 
3.3. The market equilibrium 
In calculating the open-to-migration equilibrium, the steps in Subsection 2.2 are repeated with 
two modifications: 
a) The size of the working population constraint (9) now accounts for migration, namely 
H L
N N N M+ ≤ −% % .  
b) The requirement that utility subject to (11) is equal to utility subject to (3), namely 
that *ln( / ) ln( )H Lw K wθ = , is now replaced by the requirement of utility subject to 
(11) being equal to the expected utility 
( )ln( ) 1 ln( )M Lp W p W+ − % ,        (17) 
subject to (3) and to f
M L
W w= , namely that 
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( ) ( )*ln / ln( ) 1 ln( )fH L Lw K p w p wθ = + −%% % . 
Following the steps taken in Subsection 2.2 and incorporating a) and b) enables us to 
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( )1* *
H Hw w k
α− −
=%        (19a)
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L Lw w k



























% .    (20b) 
We next formulate the following lemma. 







N% , and *
L
N%  exist, and are unique.  
The Lemma implies that *0
H
N N M< < −%  and thus that *0 1p< < , 0 1k< < , and 
0 1l< < . 
 
4. Opening up to migration from the home country: repercussions 
for human capital formation, wages, and skill distribution  
Claim 2: Once unskilled workers can migrate, skilled workers choose to form more human 
capital than when no such migration is possible. 
Claim 3: Once unskilled workers can migrate, the wages of skilled workers, both per unit of 
human capital and per worker, are higher, and the wages of unskilled workers who stay 
behind in the home country are lower than when migration is not possible. 
8 
 
Claim 3 reveals that the (expected) gain from an opening to migration that is confined to 
unskilled workers affects skilled workers who end up strictly better off than they were in the 
no-migration setting. The higher wage rate per unit of human capital induces skilled workers 
to become more skilled than in the absence of migration by unskilled workers. This result is 
surprising in the sense that on the basis of our related work on the beneficial repercussions of 
a brain drain, we might have predicted a lower accumulation of human capital by skilled 




Claim 4: An economy from which unskilled workers can migrate produces more unskilled 
and fewer skilled workers than an economy closed to such migration. 
Claim 5: The combination of enhanced human capital formation, reduced numbers of skilled 
workers, and increased numbers of unskilled workers results in a fall in the average level of 
human capital in the home country. 
The average level of human capital is lower than in the closed economy because, in the open 
economy setting, skilled workers are costlier to the firms than they are in the closed economy 
setting (cf. Claim 3). This reduces the demand for (and thereby the production of) skilled 
labor in the new equilibrium. Consequently, not only does the total “stock” of human capital 
go down, but so does the average level of human capital in the economy.  
 
5. Conclusions  
In a model in which, prior to entering the labor market, an individual decides whether to 
remain unskilled or (and, if so, to what extent) to acquire human capital in order to become a 
skilled worker, we have shown that the possibility of migrating to a developed country for 
some people changes the incentive structure for others and, consequently, the equilibrium 
outcome of the economy. The revision of wages that makes unskilled labor cheaper means 
that in the new equilibrium the home country’s firms employ fewer skilled workers in relation 
to unskilled workers than they do in the closed economy setting. Simultaneously, a higher 
wage rate per unit of human capital induces skilled workers to acquire more human capital 
than before. While not experiencing a “brain drain,” the home country suffers from “brain 
                                                           
4
 Cf. Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Stark and Wang (2002), and Fan and Stark (2007). 
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depletion,” manifested as a decline in its average level of human capital; the enhanced quality 
of skilled workers proves to be insufficient to compensate for the decline in their quantity.  
If the sharp dichotomy in the prospects of migration by skill level assumed in the model 
does not match up to the often less than clear reality, then, as long as the migration prospects 
are not skill neutral and are biased in favor of unskilled work, the qualitative results if not the 









N N=% , *θ θ=% , and 0M > , we have that 
* * * *
H H H
N N N






























= −  
 




N N M= −% , *
H H


































< =  
 
, and that ( ) ( )
* * * *
*
* *








   
= − > − =   
−   
% .   
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
We define ( )
H H
f N N≡% % , and 
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N =% , we have that ( ) ( )
H H
f N g N<% % , whereas for 
H
N N M= −% , we have that ( ) ( )
H H
f N g N>% % . Therefore, because ( )0,HN N M∈ −% , there is 
exactly one value of 
H
N%  in its domain for which ( ) ( )
H H
f N g N=% % . We denote this value by 
*
H
N% . When used in (18) through (20b), *
H
N%  determines the other endogenous variables as 
well.   
 
Proof of Claim 2:  
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Proof of Claim 3:  























































Proof of Claim 4:  
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from (16b) and (20b) that 
( )
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Proof of Claim 5:   
In the no-migration equilibrium, the number of skilled workers and the size of the workforce 












.     (A1) 
In the open-to-migration setting, the number of skilled workers and the size of the workforce 
are given, respectively, by (20a) and N M− . Consequently, the share of skilled workers in 











.       (A2) 





1 1* * * *
0
1 1
KH HN N l k
N M N K l K
αα α
θ θ θ θ
α α α α
− − −
− = − <
− − + − +
%
% .  (A3) 
Upon rearranging, (A3) can be simplified to  
( ) ( ) ( )11 1 KK k K k α αα α α α − +− + < − +   .      (A4) 
Drawing on Bernoulli’s inequality,
5
 because 0 1k< <  and because ( )1 1K α α− + > , we get 
that  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )1






+ − − + < + −       .        (A5) 




 in the right hand side of (A4) to 
get that (A4) holds as long as the following inequality holds: 
( )1 1k k α< + − , 
which then simplifies to the condition 1k < .   
                                                           
5
 For any 1x > − , ( )1 1
r
x xr+ > +  for 1r > , and ( )1 1
r
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